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Summary
The paper analyses the timing of spontaneous environmental innovation when second-
mover advantages, arising from the expectation of declining investment costs, increase
the option value of waiting created by investment irreversibility and uncertainty about
private payoffs. We then focus on the design of public subsidies aimed at bridging the
gap between the spontaneous time of technological change and the socially desirable
one. Under network externalities and incomplete information about firms’ switching
costs, auctioning investment grants appears to be a cost-effective way of accelerating
pollution abatement, in that it allows targeting grants instead of subsidizing the entire
industry indiscriminately.
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Since pollution abatement generally requires investment expenditures, pro￿t-
maximizing ￿rms do not spontaneously improve their environmental perfor-
mance1 unless costs are o⁄set by some expected private bene￿ts. Following
the literature on so-called voluntary approaches, these bene￿ts may come
from better use of inputs (e.g. energy or material savings, abatement of
waste disposal costs), sales increase (consumers may be willing to pay more
for environment-friendly products or for goods produced by a ￿rm which has
acquired a green reputation) and/or regulatory gains (pre-emption of more
stringent mandatory regulation or regulatory capture) (Brau and Carraro,
1999; Carraro and LØveque, 1999).
The performance of self-regulation has been analysed across di⁄erent di-
mensions, including its impacts upon market competition and environmental
e⁄ectiveness. As far as the latter is concerned, Carraro and LØveque (1999)
cite two frequent sources of concern about the actual contribution of volun-
tary approaches to environmental quality improvements. One is that ￿rms
may not respect their commitments. The second cause concerns the low
ambition of pollution abatement targets.
A third potential cause of ine⁄ectiveness, addressed in this paper, relates
to the timing of environmental innovation. Although ￿rms have discovered
potentially pro￿table green investment opportunities, voluntary process in-
novations or changes in product design may occur too slowly, i.e. they may
not prevent undesirable levels of pollutant accumulation and environmental
damage.
Why would ￿rms, which have discovered a green investment opportu-
nity whose costs are counter-balanced by expected private gains, postpone
environmental innovation?
The real options approach to investment decisions provides a possible
answer. For instance, this approach teaches that when an agent does not
face a now-or-never investment decision, an option value of waiting emerges
before undertaking a project involving sunk costs and uncertain payo⁄s (ir-
reversibility e⁄ect). In other words, the agent may ￿nd it pro￿table to delay
the investment, despite the project exhibiting a positive net present value.2
1Firms may improve their environmental performance either by undertaking process
innovations or changes in product design which involve pollution abatement during the
product life cycle.
2Obviously, not all green investment decisions meet the conditions required in order
to apply the conclusions of the real options approach: for example, these conclusions do
not apply when ￿rms are able to recover investment expenditures should the payo⁄s (e.g.
2This standard result stems from the analysis of investment decisions
for a single agent in isolation. For instance, recent developments of the real
options approach show that when these decisions take place in a competitive
environment, strategic interactions between ￿rms may either decrease or
further increase the option value of waiting (Lambrecht and Parraudin, 2003;
Mason and Weeds, 2001; Moretto, 2000).
Generally speaking, the value of waiting may signi￿cantly decrease if
the investment payo⁄s depend on the number of ￿rms which have already
improved their environmental performance and there is an advantage in
being ￿rst. For example, pre-emption can hasten pollution abatement when
￿rms interpret self-regulation as a product di⁄erentiation strategy aimed
at di⁄erentiating their product or process from those of other ￿rms in the
industry in order to increase their market share. In other words, the risk of
foregone competitive advantages may counter-balance the bene￿ts of waiting
for additional information about counsumers￿response to the supply of green
products.
However, instead of hastening environmental innovation, strategic inter-
actions may further increase the option value of waiting. This may occur
when there is an expectation of declining switching costs, due to the di⁄u-
sion of green technologies, whilst the investment payo⁄s are not negatively
correlated (e.g. when market demand shifts upward when green products
are sold in the market) or are independent of the number of ￿rms which
have improved their environmental performances (e.g. when the investment
payo⁄s are expected to come from input savings or from avoidance of future
costs of forthcoming public regulations that ￿rms cannot in￿ uence).
Both strategic interactions typically involve an ine¢ cient time pattern
of private investment decisions. However, if we adopt a narrow view and
focus on the environmental e⁄ectiveness of self-regulation, the most critical
scenario is the one where, because of second-mover advantages, strategic
interactions exacerbate, rather than mitigate, the irreversibility e⁄ect. In
particular, the expectation of declining investment costs may involve a war
of attrition whose e⁄ect is to further delay pollution abatement.
Two strands of literature are related to this paper. The ￿rst one, dealing
with irreversible investments involving stochastic returns, was initiated by
McDonald and Siegel (1986) and systematized by Dixit and Pindyck (1994),
whose key idea is that when a risky project, involving sunk costs, is not a
one-in-a-lifetime opportunity, the ability to choose the time of investment
creates an option value of waiting: the greater the degree of uncertainty
consumers￿willingness to pay for green products) turn out to be worse than anticipated.
3about the investment payo⁄s, the larger the option value and the delay.
The second strand of literature relates to innovation and standardis-
ation in the presence of so-called network externalities, implying lack of
co-ordination, free-riding and excess inertia in technological change (Farrell
and Saloner, 1985; Katz and Shapiro, 1985).
The purpose of this paper is twofold. First, we illustrate the impacts
of the war of attrition upon the option value of waiting and, consequently,
upon the private time of pollution abatement. Secondly, assuming that a
public authority has somehow arbitrarily pre-identi￿ed the desirable time for
technological change, we focus on the design of policy instruments - namely,
investment grants - aimed at bridging the gap between the spontaneous time
of environmental innovation and the "socially" desirable one.
We do this by extending and generalizing the continuous-time model
of environmental policy adoption of Dosi and Moretto (1997; 1998). Dosi
and Moretto (1997) stressed that, in order to enhance the e⁄ectiveness of
environmental policies, policy-makers should account for the option value
￿rms face when deciding the time of an investment involving sunk costs and
uncertain returns. However, they considered only the irreversible e⁄ect and
for one ￿rm in isolation. Dosi and Moretto (1998) analysed the impacts of
declining switching costs in a duopoly model and argued that public au-
thorities may accelerate environmental innovation by auctioning investment
grants. Here we generalize the above papers considering both the irreversible
e⁄ect and network externalities in a N +1 agents-model and organizing the
competition for the investment grant as a second-price sealed-bid private
value auction where ￿rms simultaneusly submit their bids, without seeing
others￿bids, the subsidy is granted to the most e¢ cient ￿rm and it is priced
according to the second-best bidder.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section two presents a
model in which N + 1 ￿rms, belonging to the same industry, face the same
opportunity of undertaking an irreversible green investment involving sto-
chastic payo⁄s; each agent￿ s timing of technological change is in￿ uenced by
the investment decision of the other, because switching costs are negatively
correlated to the number of ￿rms which have adopted the new technology.
Section three deals with the war of attrition game that emerges; we show
that if switching costs are private knowledge, the free-riding attitude in-
duced by the expectation of network bene￿ts may signi￿cantly increase the
option value of waiting and, consequently, the investment delay. Section
four focuses on the design of public incentives aimed at bridging the gap
between the expected private time of innovation and the socially desirable
time; we examine the properties of a second-price auction, in which agents
4bid for the right to obtain public funds for use in ￿nancing the technological
change.
2 The model
We consider a situation where N + 1 (N > 0) risk neutral ￿rms, belonging
to the same industry, can abandon, at any time, their present (polluting)
production process, in order to adopt a new (green) one, by a⁄ording a sunk
switching cost Cn; n = 1;2:::::N + 1:
The instantaneous investment payo⁄ at time t, xt is assumed to be ex-
ogenous, una⁄ected by the number of agents which have adopted the green
technology3, and stochastic, evolving according to a geometric Brownian
motion:
dxt = ￿xtdt + ￿xtdzt with ￿;￿ > 0 and x0 = x: (1)
where dzt is the increment of a standard Wiener process, uncorrelated over
time and satisfying the conditions that E(dzt) = 0 and E(dz2
t) = dt; and
both the drift parameter ￿ and the volatility parameter (￿) are constant
over time. Therefore E(dxt) = ￿xtdt and E(dx2
t) = (￿xt)2dt; i.e. starting
from the initial value x0; the random position of the instantaneous payo⁄
xt at time t > 0 has lognormal distribution with mean x0e￿t and variance
x2
0(e￿2t ￿ 1) which increases as we look further and further into the future.
Moreover, it should be noted that the process has no memory, and hence i)
at any point in time t;the observed xt is the best predictor of future pro￿ts,
ii) xt may next move upwards or downwards with equal probability.
Agents￿switching cost, Cn, depends on the number of ￿rms q which have
adopted the green technology:
Cn(￿;q) = ￿nk(q); n = 1;2:::N + 1 and q = 1;2:::N + 1
where k(q) stands for the pure capital cost which is common knowledge, and
￿n 2 [0 ￿ ￿;￿ ￿ ￿ 1] is a private valuation parameter re￿ ecting agent n￿ s
3As anticipated, the aim of this paper is to focus on situations where strategic interac-
tions exacerbate the impacts of investment irreversibility and uncertainty. However, the
model could be easily expanded in order to explore the impacts of pre-emption upon envi-
ronmental innovation time. For instance, if the instantaneous investment payo⁄s decline
with the number of green ￿rms, a ￿rst-mover advantage will emerge whose e⁄ect is to
reduce the second-mover advantage resulting from the expectation of declining investment
costs. See Moretto (2000) for an application of both e⁄ects to a duopoly model.
5perception of foregone alternative investment opportunities in the future.
For the sake of simplicity we assume that:
k(q) =
￿
k for q = 1
k ￿ ￿k for q 6= 1
We assume that ￿k > 0, so that there is an advantage in co-ordinating
or joining a network: the higher the agent￿ s investment opportunity cost,
￿n, the greater its share value of the network bene￿t.
According to the classical real-option based models (Dixit and Pindyck,
1994) the ￿rms￿optimal investment rule is that the new technology￿ s bene￿ts
must outweigh its costs, where the latter consist of the individual strike price
Cn plus the value of the option exercised by undertaking the investment. As,
at any time t; all information about the future evolution of x is summarized
in the current value xt, the optimal decision rule relies on a realization of x
that is necessary and su¢ cient to stop waiting and undertake the project.
In other words, the ￿rms will invest if the current ￿ ow of income xt has
crossed from below an upper single trigger value ￿ xn, n 1;2;:::N + 1.









j x0 = x
￿
8n;(2)
where r > ￿ is the constant risk-free rate of interest4 and E0(:) is the
operator expectation conditional on the information available at time t = 0:
Furthermore, Tn = inf(t > 0 j xt = ￿ x￿
n); is the future random starting time
at which ￿rm n ￿nds it optimal to go ￿rst and ￿ x￿
n is the income threshold
that triggers it.
Let￿ s ￿nally consider an agency which, on the grounds of available in-
formation on ￿rms￿pollutant emissions, accumulation processes and conse-
quent environmental damage, has identi￿ed ^ T as the date by which all ￿rms
should abandon the polluting technology and adopt the green one.
Moreover, let￿ s assume that the agency is unable or unwilling to adopt
mandatory regulations and, if necessary, intends to accelerate environmental
innovation by subsidizing green investment expenditures. Subsidies will be
granted if, and only if, the agency believes that ￿rms face a value of wait-
ing, before undertaking the green investment, greater than the one faced by
4Alternatively we can use a discount rate that includes an appropriate adjustment for
risk and take the expectation with respect to a distribution for x that is adjusted for risk
neutrality (see Cox and Ross, 1976; Harrison and Kreps, 1979).
6society as a whole. However, since the private switching time T is a stochas-
tic variable, the agency has to set a policy-rule referring to T￿ s probability
distribution. For the sake of simplicity, we assume the following simple rule:5
E(T) = ^ T (3)
By (1) and the de￿nition of T, (3) may be reformulated in terms of the
instantaneous investment payo⁄, x, at which the technological change should
take place in order to satisfy the agency￿ s environmental objective. We
denote with ^ x the social trigger value such that E[inf(t > 0 j xt = ^ x)] = ^ T:6
To solve the optimization problem the environmental agency has to ￿nd
an optimal compensation function. In order to optimize this compensation
function for all possible functions we apply the revelation principle which
reduces the possible set of grant-aided schemes to those where lying is not
pro￿table. We organize the model as an auction of the Vikrey-type where
each ￿rm simultaneously reports their respective optimal private triggers,
without seeing each other￿ s bid, and the subsidy is given to the ￿rm that
reports the lowest one (La⁄ont and Tirole 1993 pp.314-320).
Before describing the grant-aided scheme, it is worth noting two impor-
tant features of our model. First, since the evolutionary pattern of x is a
Markov process (Harrison, 1985, pp. 80-81), the agency￿ s announcement of
^ T (or, equivalently, ^ x) does not a⁄ect the ￿rms￿waiting game played prior
to ^ T: Secondly, while the second-mover advantage, resulting from ￿k, slows
down the spontaneous technological change, the existence of network bene-
￿ts provides the agency with the opportunity to adopt a targeted policy. For
instance, by subsidizing the ￿rm with the lower trigger ￿ x￿
n (the leader ￿rm),
i.e. by anticipating initiation of the bandwagon, the agency may accelerate
the technological change throughout the entire industry.
We now proceed by deriving ￿rst the private time of environmental in-
novation and then the optimal investment grants.
5Depending on di⁄erent assumptions about the agency￿ s risk aversion, the policy-rule
can be made more stringent by giving di⁄erent weights to di⁄erent moments of the private
switching time distribution.
6As the instantaneous payo⁄s are driven by (1), the ￿rst passage time T from x to ^ x is
a stochastic variable with ￿rst moment E(T) = m
￿1 ln(
^ x




^ x = xe
￿ ^ T (Cox and Miller, 1965, p. 221-222).
73 The war of attrition
Firms￿ time of investment is a⁄ected by two sources of inertia. On the
one hand, because of sunk costs, environmental innovation is slowed by
the uncertainty about the investment payo⁄s (irreversibility e⁄ect). On
the other hand, innovation is decelerated by the second-mover advantage
resulting from declining switching costs. In particular, as far as the second
source is concerned, the uncertainty about the other ￿rms￿opportunity cost
makes it advisable to wait in order to see how things go for the others before
switching (war of attrition e⁄ect). If this does not happen and the rivals are
reluctant to adopt the green technology, the agent may eventually decide to
switch ￿rst.
At each time t ￿rms observe the realization of the state variable xt;
and, depending on their private valuation parameter ￿; decide whether to
invest. Secondly, there is a Bayesian learning process where agents learn
by observing the rivals￿behaviour. A Nash equilibrium will then be the
solution of a pair of linked stopping time problems, where each agent solves
its switching problem by taking account of the rivals￿possible actions and
learning about the rivals￿valuation parameters from the fact that they have
not switched up to that moment.
Speci￿cally, each agent n will optimally select an upper trigger level ￿ x￿
n;
n = 1;2::::N + 1: Thus, if at time t xt ￿ ￿ x￿
n and the rivals have not yet
switched, the agent n will unilaterally innovate. Otherwise, if any one of its
rivals has already switched at xt < ￿ x￿
n, agent n learns that it can adopt the
green technology by paying k ￿ ￿k and with him, all the others.
Note, however, that the certainty of being second does not imply switch-
ing immediately. As the switching cost depends on ￿, and x is assumed to
be independent of the number of green ￿rms, a lower trigger level ￿ x￿￿
n < ￿ x￿
n
always exists, below which the only dominant strategy is to keep the option
to invest alive, and wait longer before exercising it. Only when xt crosses
￿ x￿￿
n do the agents consider the possibility of switching second.
As long as ￿ x￿￿
n < xt < ￿ x￿
n each ￿rm waits for the others to change
technology ￿rst. During this period of excess inertia (Farrell and Saloner,
1985) each ￿rm experiences both costs (foregone expected cash ￿ ows) and
bene￿ts of delaying: the latter come from the hope of getting additional
information about the investment payo⁄s and by second-mover advantages.






(a) if 0 < x < ￿ x￿￿
n
(b) if ￿ x￿￿
n ￿ x < ￿ x￿
n




(a) never switch, regardless of the rivals￿behaviour;
(b) switch only if a rival has already switched, i.e. jumping on the band-
wagon;
(c) unilaterally switch, i.e. initiating the bandwagon.
3.1 The optimal private trigger values
Consider the optimal trigger value ￿ x￿
n for agent n (by symmetry the same
results hold for all N + 1 agents as well).
We suppose that ￿rm n has rational conjectures about the distribution
of the other ￿rms￿triggers. We simply assume that each ￿rm￿ s investment
trigger is continuously distributed and drawn independently from a com-
mon distribution function F(￿ x￿
n) which is strictly increasing on the interval
[￿ xl;1) and has a continuous di⁄erentiable density f(￿ x￿
n):
As long as the N + 1 ￿rms are independent, what matters for the ￿rm
n is the event min
n
￿ x￿
j; j 6= n
o












￿ 1 ￿ (1 ￿ F(￿ x￿
n))N
which is the cumulative distribution (with densitiy f(N)(￿ x￿
n)) of the mini-
mum of the N rivals￿triggers (i.e. the probability that all the other N ￿rms
have lower triggers than n) on the same support [￿ xl;1):
We will now derive the optimal investment rule for ￿rm n; taking account
of the other ￿rms￿behaviour as exogenously given. Firm n￿ s option value
at time zero to adopt the green technology at time Tn if the other ￿rms are










xte￿rtdt ￿ ￿n(k ￿ ￿k)
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In other words, ￿rm n￿ s option value of investing is given by the sum
of the option value to go as second at cost ￿n(k ￿ ￿k) when a ￿rm has
already adopted at time minj6=n(Tj) = inf(t > 0 j xt = min
n
￿ x￿
j; j 6= n
o
),
plus the option value of not investing until time Tn and then going ￿rst.
Tn = inf(t > 0 j xt = ￿ x￿
n) is then the switching time at which agent n
decides unilaterally to adopt the green technology (strategy c).
Furthermore, as xt moves randomly over time, the ￿rm n will update
its conjecture. In particular as time goes by and xt hits new upper lev-
els without the rivals switching, agent n learns that the rivals￿triggers lie
in a smaller, higher interval. A su¢ cient statistic that captures this in-
formation is given by ut = sup0<s<t(xt) which denotes the maximum level
of payo⁄ up to time t without one of the ￿rms having adopted the green
technology. The ￿rm n then observes the realization of the state variable




1￿F(N)(ut) ;which is strictly increasing on the interval [ut;1), and in-





















(1 ￿ F(N)(￿ x￿
n;ut))
The following proposition describes the properties of the stationary strat-
egy (4) resulting from maximization of (5).
Proposition 1 (a) If a threshold level ￿ x￿
n 2 [￿ xl;1) exists, such that 0 <
￿ x￿￿
n < ￿ x￿






Strategy (a) if 0 < x < ￿ x￿￿
n
Strategy (b) if ￿ x￿￿
n ￿ x < ￿ x￿
n
Strategy (c) if x ￿ ￿ x￿
n
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n) is the hazard rate.
(b) The optimal triggers are monotonically increasing in ￿n:
Proof. See Appendix.
As is apparent from (5) and (7), although the value of the investment
in the green technology depends on both the current value of xt and on the
statistic ut; the threshold that triggers this investment does not because the
the hazard rate Nh(￿ x￿
n) is independent of both xt and ut (see Appendix).
Since the hazard rate is de￿ned as the likelihood of an event occurring in
the next instant, given that the event has not occurred up to that instant,
in (7) it measures the likelihood of the ￿rm n investing at ￿ x￿
n. The hazard
rate is zero when there is no probability of one ￿rm going ￿rst and goes to
in￿nity when ut and/or N goes to in￿nity:
To see how the former case ￿ts in our model, let￿ s consider what happens
as the incomplete information case reduces to one with complete informa-
tion. If ￿n is public information and the ￿rms are not too heterogeneous (i.e.
the interval [￿;￿ ￿] is small), they have no interest in going unilaterally and
they will be better-o⁄ coordinating and choosing to invest at the time when
the ￿rm with the higher cost parameter ￿n switches, i.e. the unique Nash
equilibrium in pure strategies involves coordination. There is a common
trigger value






(r ￿ ￿)(k ￿ ￿k) sup
n2[1;N+1]
(￿n)
above which ￿rms coordinate switching to the green technology. Unlike in
Farrell and Saloner (1985), there might be excess inertia even under complete
information. The ￿rms with lower cost parameters will ￿nd it optimal to wait
until technological change becomes pro￿table for some of their rivals and
then coordinate adoption. The loss due to waiting is more than compensated
by the reduction in investment cost deriving from coordination.7
7In the symmetric case ￿n = ￿ for all n; the social optimum is always obtained. A
unique threshold ￿ x
￿￿ exists beyond which all the ￿rms ￿nd it optimal to move simultane-
ously (see Moretto, 2000).
11For the latter limit case, suppose that an upper trigger ￿ xu exists so that
￿ x￿
n 2 [￿ xl; ￿ xu]: As ut ! ￿ xu and no ￿rms have adopted yet, the ￿rm n knows
that at least one of its rivals will act almost certainly in the next few instants,
which causes the hazard rate to explode to in￿nity. The trigger value for
￿rmn should therefore also explode to in￿nity which contradicts the fact of
having an upper bound ￿ xu < 1:
Finally, a third interesting and related limiting case occurs when the
number of competing ￿rms goes to in￿nity. By the fact that limN!1 Nh(￿ x￿
n) =
1 also the trigger ￿ x￿
n converges to in￿nity. This is a straightforward con-
sequence of the war of attrition; as N increases each ￿rm knows almost
certainly that at least one of its rivals will go ￿rst. Each ￿rm takes this
opportunity, delaying the investment inde￿nitely.
The following corollary illustrates the e⁄ect of the war of attrition on
the strategic option trigger:
Corollary 1 The strategy (c)￿ s optimal trigger is situated between in￿nite
and the non-strategic trigger which, in turn, is above the second-mover trig-
ger, i.e.:
￿ x￿￿
n ￿ ￿ x+






The upper bound is reached when h(￿ x￿
n) ! 1 or N ! 1; while when
h(￿ x￿
n) ! 0 the optimal trigger converges to ￿ x￿￿ = supn2[1;N+1](￿ x￿￿
n ):
In short, whilst ￿ x+
n re￿ ects the irreversibility e⁄ect, the second term
on the r.h.s. of (7) re￿ ects the war of attrition e⁄ect which exacerbates
the impacts of investment irreversibility and uncertainty, i.e. increases the
optimal trigger value and the investment delay.
Furthermore, proposition 1 shows that the higher ￿n the greater the in-
stantaneous investment payo⁄ at which it becomes pro￿table to invest: the
optimal trigger ￿ x￿
n(￿n) is an increasing mapping function of ￿n, in the sup-
port [￿ xl(￿); ￿ xu(￿ ￿) = 1).8 Therefore, even without making use of a discrete-
time model, we can also have sequential investments depending on the wedge
in agents￿valuation parameter ￿n: Speci￿cally, if the ￿rm n is the leader,
we get the following result.
8Using a model of preemption Lambrecht and Perraudin (2003) show that asymmetric
information on costs results in the optimal trigger value ￿ x
￿
n being a unique continuous
increasing mapping function of ￿n, i.e. ￿ x
￿
n = ￿ x
￿
n(￿n) 2 [￿ x
l(￿); ￿ x





12Corollary 2 Sequential investment (￿ di⁄usion￿) exists if ￿ x￿￿
j (￿j) > ￿ x￿
n(￿n);
for some j 6= n.
3.2 Numerical results
To illustrate the properties of the above model and get some quantitative
ideas of the impact exercised by the war of attrition on the competitive
adoption of the new technology, in this section we provide some numerical
solutions of (6) and (7). The choice of parameters was made in the interest
of simplicity, respecting as far as possible some indications found in other
studies (Dixit and Pindyck,1994; Mauer and Ott, 1995; Lambrecht and Per-
raudin,2003). The base parameters take the values: r = 0:05;￿ = 0:03; ￿ =
0:2; N = 4; k = 10 and ￿k = 5; 2:5:The choice of ￿ is made to guarantee
the ￿rms￿average waiting time positive. Figures 1 and 2 show numerical
solutions for ￿ x￿￿
n (￿n) and ￿ x￿
n(￿n) within the interval ￿n 2 [0;2]; when F(￿ x￿
n)






; with ￿ = 1 and ￿ xl = 0:094.
Figure 1. Network e⁄ect ￿k = 5
13Figure 2. Network e⁄ect ￿k = 2:5
The triggers shown include: (i) the strategic trigger ￿ x￿
n; the non-strategic
trigger ￿ x+
n; and the second-mover trigger ￿ x￿￿
n ; for cost reduction of 50% and
25% respectively. In both cases the solution starts at the origin and increases
monotonically for all the interval [0;2]: The second-mover trigger is always
far below the optimal trigger under the war of attrition. In addition the
ratio between the strategic trigger and the non-strategic trigger, ￿ x￿
n=￿ x+
n;
equals 2:48 for ￿k = 5 and 1:74 for ￿k = 2:5 respectively. Thus current
investment payo⁄s have to rise more than double the level that ensures a
positive net bene￿t for a single ￿rm in isolation before the war of attrition
ceases to be worth playing by the ￿rms (war of attrition e⁄ect). If, to this
e⁄ect, we add the irreversible e⁄ect measured by the mutiplier
￿
￿￿1 = 3:85
(i.e. ￿ = 1:35); we get a total e⁄ect of 5 to 6 times the point in which the
total expected discounted investment payo⁄s equals the cost of investment,
i.e. the Marshallian trigger ￿ xM
n ￿ (r ￿￿)￿nk (Dixit and Pindick, 1994, pp.
144-145). Therefore, even if the cost of capital is as low as 5% per year,
the value of waiting with cost externalities can quite easily lead to adjusted
hurdle rates of 20 to 30 per cent.
4 Auctioning investment grants
To ￿nd a feasible incentive mechanism, consistent with the policy-objective
(3) and able to minimize private informational rents, we consider a Bayesian
auction where the N + 1 ￿rms are required to simultaneously announce
14their private trigger levels and, by the monotonicity property, the subsidy
is granted to the ￿rm announcing the lowest one.
In particular, in this paragraph, it will be shown that the subsidy re-
ceived by the leader is formed by the sum of a ￿xed payment function
(individual rational transfer) - de￿ned according to the di⁄erence between
the announced trigger ~ x￿
n and the social trigger ^ x- plus a linear sharing of
overruns which depends on the announced trigger value. If this subsidy is
incentive-compatible it will be su¢ cient to induce the leader to announce
the true trigger, ~ x￿
n = ￿ x￿
n, and to adopt the green technology when x, ran-
domly ￿ uctuating, hits the social trigger ^ x. Although granting a subsidy
only to the leader ￿rm may not be enough to achieve the policy objec-
tive, by creaming the industry the proposed grant-aided scheme allows the
agency to induce the followers to jump on the bandwagon without paying
informational rents.9
The rationale behind the proposed grant-aided scheme can be sum-
marised as follows. Since the war of attrition which will emerge within
the industry can be interpreted as a sequence of (all-pay) second-price auc-
tions10, granting a subsidy to the leader ￿rm implies that the agent with
the lowest investment opportunity cost, whilst losing the war of attrition,
will be the winning bidder in the public auction. By contrast, the followers
will gain the network bene￿t, but will not receive public subsidies, unless
their investment opportunity costs are so high that a public grant is still
required in order to avoid an indesirable time lag between the leader￿ s and
the followers￿environmental innovation time.
9By the revelation principle instead of having the ￿rms submit their bid as a function
of ￿ x
￿
n and then applying the rules of the auction mechanism to choose who receives the
subsidy, we could directly ask the ￿rms to report their values ￿ x
￿
n and then make sure that
the outcome is the same as if they had submitted bids.
10Referring to the literature of auctions, what has just been described as a war of
attrition can be interpreted as a sequence of all-pay second-price auctions (Hirshleifer
and Riley, 1992, ch.10). For instance, at each time t; it is as if agents bid the value of
their opportunity to invest (5), Vn(xt; ￿ x
￿
n); and compare the relative merit of dropping out
immediately (investing ￿rst) or staying in (delaying the decision) and bidding a further
amount: Agents bid by deciding upon a maximum (stochastic) number of periods over
which to compete which is determined by their optimal trigger levels ￿ x
￿
n: Thus, as long as
￿rms can perfectly observe the rival￿ s actions and immediately respond to them, if after
Tn = inf(t > 0 j xt = ￿ x
￿
n) periods ￿rms j 6= n ￿nd that n has abandoned the polluting



















￿ ￿j(k ￿ ￿k); 8j 6= n (8)
provided that ￿nk ￿ ￿j(k ￿ ￿k).
154.1 The agency￿ s optimization problem
Let￿ s assume that the environmental agency acts as a utilitarian regulator
interested in accelerating environmental innovation.
Since ￿ x￿
n is private information, in order to exploit the potential regula-
tory bene￿ts resulting from network externalities, the agency has to identify
an appropriate incentive mechanism such that the (unknown) leader ￿rm
will ￿nd it pro￿table to abandon the polluting technology the ￿rst time x,
randomly ￿ uctuating, hits the social trigger ^ x.
Therefore, de￿ning yn(￿ x￿
n;￿ x￿
￿n) as the probability that ￿rm n is se-
lected to receive the subsidy, with ￿ x￿








yn = 1; the optimal targeted grant-aided scheme, under incomplete
information, should emerge maximizing at time ^ T a welfare function, the

















n; ^ x) (9)
where B is the (agency￿ s) estimated social bene￿t brought about by acceler-
ating environmental innovation (i.e. by lowering ￿rms￿optimal trigger value
at ^ x), sn(￿ x￿
n;￿ x￿
￿n) is the subsidy in annuity terms, ￿ ￿ 0 is the shadow cost
of public funds and ￿n(￿ x￿
n; ^ x) denotes the subsidized ￿rm￿ s rental price:
￿n(￿ x￿




￿n) ￿ yn(￿ x￿
n;￿ x￿
￿n)(￿ x￿
n ￿ ^ x)
￿
; for ^ x ￿ ￿ x￿
n:
Furthermore, without loss of generality, we may assume that the agency
knows the ￿rms￿ conjectural distribution. Therefore, conditional on the
information available at the time when the grant-aided scheme is announced,
the ￿rms￿optimal trigger levels are drawn independently from the same
continuous distribution F(￿ x￿
n;ut), with density f(￿ x￿
n;ut) and ut = ^ x:
























subject to all the N +1 ￿rms￿optimization problem. The ￿rm￿ s n optimiza-





n; ^ x) ￿ 0 8n
16In the case of N + 1 ￿rms whose private trigger values are drawn in-
dependently from the same continuous distribution with monotone hazard
rate, an optimal Bayesian auction will give the subsidy to the ￿rm with
the lowest trigger (La⁄ont and Tirole, 1993, pp. 314-318). Continuing with
agent n as representative, the following proposition indicates the results of
this Bayesian auction.
















n ￿ ^ x)(1￿F(￿ x￿





n; ^ x))Nd~ x￿
n
Proof. See Appendix.














which shows that the subsidy is strictly monotone decreasing in ￿ x￿
n, and
con￿rms the e¢ ciency of the auction: the subsidy is given to the most
e¢ cient ￿rm.
4.2 Implementation
While maximization of (9) determines expected transfers, i.e. the ￿rms￿
optimal reporting strategies on average given the rivals￿strategies through
the probability (1 ￿ F(N)(￿ x￿
n; ^ x)), we can construct a dominant strategy
auction of a Vickrey type that implements the same investment strategy as
the one found from optimizing the welfare function (9), and selects the most
e¢ cient ￿rm.11
Since, for the Vickrey auction, revelation of the true trigger value ￿ x￿
n is
a dominant strategy but the subsidy is priced according to the second bid
11A dominant strategy auction is an auction where each agent has a strategy that is
optimal for any bids by its opponents.
17(second-price auction), in our N + 1 agents case this implies implementing
a subsidisation scheme of the type:
(10)
~ sn(￿ x￿
n; ^ x) = (￿ x￿













n; ^ x) = 0 otherwise
When agent n wins the auction, the subsidy is equal to the individu-
ally rational transfer (￿ x￿
n ￿ ^ x) plus the rent it gets when the conjectural






Since E￿ xj f~ si(￿ x￿
i; ^ x)g = si(￿ x￿
i; ^ x); the contract given by (10) costs the same
in terms of annuity subsidy as the optimal Bayesian auction (La⁄ont and
Tirole, 1993, pp. 319-320).
Thus competition among the ￿rms implies that the interval of possi-











is the second-lowest bid reported at time ^ T when the
auction is run.
Alternatively, we can calculate the total subsidy to be transferred to the
leader ￿rm as:
Sn(￿ x￿




^ x + (￿ x￿
























Recalling that xt has lognormal distribution with mean E0(xt) = x0e￿t;
the ￿rst term in the r.h.s. of (11) represents the expected net present value
of the payo⁄s starting at the given initial position x ^ T = ^ x+~ sn(￿ x￿
n; ^ x); whilst
the second term is the net present value of the project starting at the initial
position ^ x without compensation.
Continuing with the numerical solutions of section 3.2, we are able to
evalute the total subsidy (11). In this respect, let￿ s assume that the second-
lowest bidding ￿rm has a private valuation parameter equal (normalized)






= 1:34 for ￿k = 2:5 and 1:91 for ￿k = 5 respectively.
18If ^ T = 20 years from now and the income starting state is x = 1; the
social trigger value equals ^ x = 1:22. Then, provided that ￿ x￿
n > 1:22;the
winning ￿rm￿ s total subsidy is equal to Sn = 6 with ￿k = 2:5 and 34:5
with a cost reduction ￿k = 5 respectively.12 If ^ T reduces to 10 years and
then ^ x = 1:1; the total subsidy increases substantially from Sn = 12 with
￿k = 2:5 to 40:5 with ￿k = 5 respectively.
Although the above results should be viewed as illustrative in nature
and limited to giving an initial idea of the magnitude of the network e⁄ect,
they show that the total subsidy to induce the most e¢ cient ￿rm to adopt
the green technology earlier can be considerably higher than the investment
cost. This suggests guidelines for more realistic research.
So far, we have considered the case where the network bene￿t ￿k is
such that adoption of the green technology by the (subsidized) leader ￿rm
is su¢ cient to induce the other ￿rms to switch immediately afterwards.
However, as shown in Corollary 2, we can have di⁄usion depending on the
wedge in ￿rms￿opportunity cost ￿. In particular, when n goes ￿rst, we get
sequential adoption if ￿ x￿￿
j (￿j) > ￿ x￿
n(￿n); at least for some j 6= n. In this case,
granting a subsidy to the leader ￿rm is not enough to induce technological
change throughout the entire industry: in other words, a subsidy should also
be granted to other ￿rms. However, under our assumptions, on the basis
of the announcement received from the leader ￿rm, the subsidy received by
the followers does not involve payment of an informational rent and it will
be calculated referring to ￿ x￿￿
j :
5 Final remarks
Even when ￿rms have discovered theoretically pro￿table green investment
opportunities, various sources of inertia may involve a private time of en-
vironmental innovation incompatible with avoidance of undesired levels of
pollutant accumulation and environmental damage.
This may occur when investment irreversibility, and the ability to post-
pone the decision, creates an option value of waiting before undertaking a
technological change involving uncertain payo⁄s.
Strategic interactions may either decrease or further increase this option
value. This occurs when the value of an investment depends on the number
of ￿rms which have undertaken the technological change, so that each agent￿ s
investment time is in￿ uenced by the investment decisions of others.
12The private average waiting time for ￿ = 1 varies from nearly 30 to 65 years.
19In this paper we have examined what appears to be the most critical
scenario from an environmental point of view, i.e. a situation where second-
mover advantages exacerbate the irreversibility e⁄ect and increase the option
value of waiting. In particular, we have explored the impacts of second-
mover advantages arising from the expectation of declining investment costs
due to the di⁄usion of new green technologies.
Although the expectation of declining investment costs tends to further
decelerate voluntary irreversible green investments, the existence of network
bene￿ts provides the policy-maker with the opportunity of targeting invest-
ment grants to the ￿rm(s) with lower switching costs. In fact, by acceler-
ating initiation of technological change, the regulator may induce the whole
industry to switch.
However, this policy strategy requires knowledge of the private switching
costs. Otherwise, appropriate incentive mechanisms are required to mini-
mize agents￿informational rents.
To ￿nd a cost-e⁄ective grant-aided scheme, we have examined a second-
price sealed-bid private value auction where agents are required to announce
their optimal trigger values, and a subsidy is granted to the ￿rm which
announces the lowest one, i.e. to the agent with the lowest switching cost.
However the subsidy is priced according to the second-best bidder. Besides
taking into account pure capital expenditures and including informational
rents, the subsidy under consideration must compensate the leader ￿rm
for killing its option value of waiting. In other words, the ￿rm must be
compensated for the loss of bene￿ts from delaying investment, i.e. for the
value of waiting for more information about the investment payo⁄s and for
the loss of network bene￿ts.
Granting a subsidy only to the leader ￿rm may prove to be insu¢ cient
to induce the other agents to switch immediately afterwards. For instance,
simultaneous or sequential environmental innovation may emerge, depend-
ing on the wedge in ￿rms￿switching cost. However, under the proposed
grant-aided scheme, the subsidy received by the follower does not involve
payment of an informational rent. In other words, auctioning investment
grants may prove to be a cost-e⁄ective way of creaming the industry, and
accelerating environmental innovation, under incomplete information about
private switching costs.
20A Appendix
A.1 proof of proposition 1
The ￿rst part of the proof consists in identifying the optimal choice of the
pure strategies￿trigger levels for all players as a function of the state variable
x and of the conjectural distribution F, and then looking for the stationary
Nash equilibrium strategies. Let￿ s begin with strategy (b). As investment
payo⁄s do not depend on the number of green ￿rms, agent n does not need
to know his rivals￿valuation parameter ￿ to follow strategy (b). He will
consider switching only if xt ￿ ￿ x￿￿
n which is obtained by maximizing:
Vn(￿ x￿￿





xte￿rtdt ￿ ￿n(k ￿ ￿k)
￿
j x0 = x
￿
(12)
By using standard results (McDonald and Siegel, 1986; Dixit and Pindyck,
1994), it easy to write (12) as:
Vn(￿ x￿￿











where ￿ > 1 is the positive root of the quadratic equation ￿(￿) ￿ 1
2￿2￿(￿￿
1) + ￿￿ ￿ r = 0:
Finally, taking the derivative of the above expression with respect to
￿ x￿￿
















for x < ￿ x￿￿
n
x




n is the point at which Vn(x; ￿ x￿￿
n ) smoothpastes to the exercise line
x
r￿￿ ￿ ￿n(k ￿ ￿k) (Dixit and Pindyck, 1994, p. 183)
Let￿ s continue with strategy (c). If agent n decides to invest unilaterally,
taking account of the probability of being anticipated, the value at time t of
adopting the green technology is given by (5). As stated in the text, using
Bayes￿rule, the relationship between F(N)(￿ x￿
n) and F(N)(￿ x￿
n;ut) for t > 0






where ut = sup
0<s<t
(xt): (15)





n) as the current value of the hazard
rate, it can be easily seen that it is independent of ut; that is:
f(N)(￿ x￿
n;ut)













































































The ￿rst term accounts for the case in which ut < ￿ x￿￿
n : In this case,
the agent does not invest even if it knows that it will pay k ￿ ￿k. The
second term is the usual option value of a single ￿rm, and ￿nally the third
term is the expected gain by ￿ghting before adopting. Firm n￿ s optimal






































￿￿1(r￿￿)￿nk is the trigger value of going ￿rst without strategic
behaviour (or if ￿rms do not expect a network bene￿t, i.e. ￿k = 0). Looking
for a maximum of Vn(xt; ￿ x￿
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where the assumption that h(￿ x￿
n) is increasing in ￿ x￿
n assures the su¢ ciency.13




n = ￿ x+
n + (￿ x+
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n is invariant to the current value of the state variable x; in
general it is not so with respect to ut: The agent cannot credibly commit
itself to the trigger level
￿ x￿
n
￿n as xt increases, and the bandwagon optimal rule
de￿ned in (4) and (20) is a contingent plan of how to play each time t for
possible realization of the state x; which summarizes the entire history of
the game up to that point: However, as the hazard rate (16) is independent
of ut, the trigger value also becomes independent of the information variable
ut: This makes the optimal operating rule an stationary.
Finally, by (17) and (20) we are able to write the value of the option to










t + A(￿ x￿
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n)x
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n
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r￿￿ ￿ ￿n(k ￿ ￿k)
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That is, the stationary trigger ￿ x￿
n is the point at which the envelope func-
tion Vn(ut;ut) smoothpastes to the exercise line xt
r￿￿ ￿ ￿nk (Moretto, 2000;
Lambrecht and Perraudin, 2003). This concludes the ￿rst part of the propo-
sition.
13This assumption is satis￿ed by standard distributions as uniform, negative exponen-
tial, Weibull and Pareto.
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Positivity of the above expression is guaranteed by the second order condi-
tion for a maximum (19).
A.2 Proof of proposition 2
We look for an incentive-compatible mechanism [sn(:);yn(:)]; n = 1;2:::N +
1 that induces a truth-telling Bayesian Nash equilibrium. De￿ning with
sn(~ x￿
n;~ x￿
￿n) the ￿rm n￿ s subsidy per unit of time, required to induce adoption
of the green technology at ^ x; as a function of the announced trigger levels
~ x￿
n and the rivals￿ announcement ~ x￿
￿n = (~ x1; ~ x2;::~ xn￿1;:; ~ xn+1;::~ xN+1), its
expected rental price can be expressed as:
￿n(￿ x￿
n; ~ x￿




￿n) ￿ yn(~ x￿
n;~ x￿
￿n)(￿ x￿
n ￿ ^ x)
￿
; for ^ x ￿ ~ x￿
n:
(22)
We refer to (22) as the ￿rm n￿ s pro￿t function, and yn(~ x￿
n;~ x￿
￿n) is the







A necessary condition for truth-telling is that the derivatives of ￿rms￿
pro￿t with respect to the agent n￿ s announcement ~ x￿
n, and evaluated at the
true trigger value, i.e. ~ x￿
















n ￿ ^ x)
￿
= 0; 8n (23)
Then, letting ￿n(￿ x￿
n; ^ x) be ￿rm n￿ s pro￿t function when telling the truth, by












< 0; 8n (24)
That is, at the optimum the pro￿t function is nonincreasing in ￿ x￿
n: It follows
that the ￿rm n￿ s individual rationality (participation constraint) is satis￿ed
24if it is satis￿ed at x = ￿ xu ￿ 1:Finally, by using (22) and (23) to integrate
(24), we obtain:
￿n(￿ x￿













and the su¢ cient condition for truth-telling requires (Fudenberg and Tirole








￿ 0; 8n: (26)
From (9) and the above arguments, the environmental agency￿ s ex ante


















n; ^ x) (27)
Since the agency￿ s objective function is decreasing in ￿n, and from (24) the
pro￿t function is decreasing in ￿ x￿
n; the individual participation constraint
will be tight at the highest trigger value ￿ xu: That is, assuming that, outside
the relationship with the regulator, each ￿rm has opportunities normalized
to zero, we get: ￿n(￿ xu; ^ x) = 0; for all n:
The agency￿ s optimization problem under incomplete information can





















































￿n) = 1; for any ￿ x￿
n and ￿ x￿
￿n:
25As is usual in the regulatory theory under asymmetry of information, we
￿rst ignore the second-order condition to check later that it is indeed sat-
is￿ed at the optimum. As ￿n is considered the state variable in the above
maximization, we can substitute (25) in the agency￿ s objective function and
solve for the optimal yn: Integrating by parts (28) for given ￿ x￿
￿n; the objec-
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n; ^ x;x;￿) =
￿
B ￿ (1 + ￿)
￿
(￿ x￿








By the monotone hazard rate assumption the term R(￿ x￿
n; ^ x;x;￿) is nonin-
creasing in ￿ x￿
n; therefore the optimal choice by the regulator would be:
yn(￿ x￿
n;￿ x￿
￿n) = 1 if ￿ x￿




￿n) = 0 if ￿ x￿









is nonincreasing almost everywhere which im-
plies that the second order condition (26) is always satis￿ed. Finally, from

















































i; ^ x) ￿ (1￿F(￿ x￿
i; ^ x))N; we get the subsidy
in the text. This concludes the proof.
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